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The subject of the present dissertation is the analysis of the territorial parameter of the jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court (hereinafter: the ICC) under article 12 ICC Statute. According to this provision, 
the Court shall have jurisdiction if “the conduct in question occurs” in the “territory of” a State Party to the 
Rome Statute. This topic is approached on the basis of the positivist tradition of public international law. The 
main research questions are formulated as follows: 
a) How could jurisdictional questions concerning criminal activity, which cannot be isolated in a specific 
territory, be addressed by the Court? 
b) How could the Court tackle jurisdictional questions under article 12(2)(a) when the crimes allegedly 
occur in occupied territories?
The methodology used is bibliographical research of the relevant literature and case-law on the topic and 
its analysis through deductive reasoning and legal analogy. The main perspective is that of public 
international law, as opposed to a criminal law, criminology or sociology.
Chapter 2 lays down certain important definitions of terms used in the present work, the basic distinctions 
of criminal jurisdiction on the basis of territory, (subjective territoriality, objective territoriality, ubiquity and 
the effects doctrine) and finally it establishes as the main framework of analysis Mann’s doctrine of 
jurisdiction. 
In Chapter 3, the travaux preparatoires of article 12 are analyzed, while Chapter 4 lays down the main 
instruments for the interpretation of this provision, with emphasis on the teleological interpretation for 
article 12(2)(a) and the argument that the principle of legality under article 22 ICC Statute (nullum crimen 
nulla poena sine lege) is not applicable for the interpretation of article 12(2)(a). 
Chapter 5 of the present work begins the analysis of article 12 by attempting an interpretation of the terms 
‘conduct in question’ in that provision. In the first part thereof, certain basic principles are provided. One of 
the basic tenets of this chapter – and indeed of the entire work – is that the question of interpretation of this 
provision is one that falls squarely within the Court’s compétence de la compétence as an inherent power 
of the Court. Drawing from the theory of the law of international organizations, this implies by logical 
necessity that, since the power of the Court to decide on its own jurisdiction stems exclusively from its 
nature as a judicial institution, its application cannot be precluded or delimited by arguments rooted in the 
doctrine of delegation of authority. Accordingly, the position in this work is that arguments seeking to restict 
the scope of interpretation of article 12 claiming that, if a certain interpretation of territoriality is not 
applicable in the system of a State Party, then the Court does not have the authority to apply it, should be 
dismissed as this power exists independently of state consent. At the same time, however, this power is not 
without limits. It does not mean for example that the Court can interpret Article 12(2)(a) in such a way as to 
include for example universal jurisdiction, effectively amending the Statute. It does indicate however that 
the Court is entitled to a larger margin for interpretation than the one it currently employs – or is currently 
willing to acknowledge. It is therefore submitted that the Court may interpret this provision in accordance 
with permissible interpretations of territoriality under international law, even if such interpretation is not 
espoused by the courts of one or more States Parties.
Taking this as a starting point, the second part of Chapter 5 envisages two possible interpretations of the 
terms ‘conduct in question’ in article 12(2)(a); first, that conduct in question refers to criminal conduct, as 
opposed to criminal consequences or circumstances, along the lines suggested by Article 30 ICC Statute. 
This means that the Court would have territorial jurisdiction only if the Prosecutor proved that the criminal 
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conduct took place on State Party territory, as opposed to the territory of a State not Party. The second 
possible interpretation – which is favoured by the present author – is that ‘conduct in question’ means in fact 
‘crime in question’. From this perspective, the Court would have jurisdiction insofar as the criminal activity 
takes place in State Party territory in whole or in part – irrespective of the distinction between consequences 
and conduct. This position finds support not only in the early jurisprudence of the Court on the matter, but 
also in the writings of publicists and the drafting process of article 12(2)(a) ICC Statute. The next parts of 
this Chapter are dedicated to an analysis of the possibilities available under the Court insofar as the 
doctrine of objective territoriality and ubiquity are concerned, from the perspective of the Mann doctrine of 
jurisdiction (‘doctrine of connecting links’).
Chapter 6 addresses the question of whether the interpretation of Article 12(2)(a) could go so far as to 
include the effects doctrine of jurisdiction, mostly known from its application in antitrust/competition law. 
This Chapter seeks to explain that the effects doctrine has been applied in the past by national courts in 
their interpretation of territorial jurisdiction in criminal matters or quasi-criminal matters. The argument is 
addressed first on the policy level and secondly on the legal level. Insofar as the policy dimension of the 
issue is concerned, the present author takes the view that a comparison of the values involved tilts the 
scales in favour of the application of the effects doctrine by the International Criminal Court. Indeed, one 
fails to see why the International Criminal Court should not be entitled to extensively interpret its territorial 
jurisdiction in order to combat impunity for crimes such as genocide and war crimes, when national courts 
have consistently and increasingly done so, in order to protect the spending capacity of their consumers 
from anticompetitive practices. On the other hand, the legal argument seems to be more difficult to make. 
The classification of the ‘effects’ that would animate the Court’s jurisdiction, the question of whether there 
is indeed a lacuna in article 12(2)(a) such that would justify the use of analogy in interpretation and the 
issues concerning state co-operation are some of the important matters highlighted and analysed. In 
closing this chapter, the author explains that, while at present this idea might constitute simply an effort at 
progressive development of the law, it is nonetheless an idea that merits further attention by the Court, in 
order to expand the territorial parameter of its reach in the future.
Chapter 7 addresses the territorial jurisdiction of the Court under article 12(2)(a)  in situations of belligerent 
occupation. This Chapter does not deal with Palestine, as the investigation is on hold until it is ascertained 
whether Palestine qualifies as a ‘state’ for the purposes of the Rome Statute. Following a brief exposition of 
certain basic principles and rules of the law of occupation, this Chapter tackles three different scenarios; 
the occupation of State Party territory by another State Party (e.g. Ituri by Uganda), of State Party territory 
by a State not Party (e.g. Cyprus by Turkey), and State not Party territory by a State Party (e.g. Iraq by the 
United Kingdom). This chapter analyzes all three of these situations and concludes that, while the exercise 
of jurisdiction in the first two situations is largely uncontroversial, since occupation does not formally affect 
the sovereign right of jurisdiction of the occupied state, the third one is more difficult to apply. In this 
situation the author examines whether or not, and, if so, to what extent the International Criminal Court 
could use the interpretation of territorial jurisdiction on the basis of ‘effective control’, along the lines of the 
jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights. The author’s 
opinion is that the differences in the wording, the context and the purposes of the instruments compared 
are such that do not allow much room for the application of the human rights interpretation of jurisdiction to 
article 12(2)(a) ICC Statute, although this possibility cannot be completely excluded due to the influnce of 
article 21(3) thereof.
The concluding chapter recapitulates the main findings of the present research and highlights that, while 
under international law the Court has many options available to it for the interpretation of the territorial 
parameter of its jurisdiction, its jurisprudence so far has not dealt with any of these issues. The hope is 
expressed that, should the need arise in the future, the Court will assume a teleological approach to the 
interpretation of Article 12(2)(a) more conducive to the goals it purports to achieve.
